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Rebalancing the central-local relationship: Achieving a bottom-up 
approach to localism in England 
John Stanton*  
City, University of London 
Recent governments have introduced a plethora of reforms seeking to decentralise 
power to local government in England. Invariably, however, these have fallen 
short of stated objectives, leaving councils at the mercy of central supervision and 
with insufficient local autonomy. This article explores the reasons underpinning 
this concern. It identifies a top-down approach to localism and considers the 
culture of centralism that persists as a consequence. It then discusses how a 
bottom-up approach might be achieved, exploring how political and legal 
mechanisms can protect councils from centralised interference in the future. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The 2014 Scottish Independence Referendum, and the debates that encircled it, 
has been a catalyst for fresh discussions on the allocation of power within the UK 
Constitution. This has manifested itself not only in relation to devolution to the 
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UK regions – particularly Scotland,1 where a second referendum was considered 
(though later shelved) following the Brexit vote2 – but also in respect of local 
government in England, where often-had discussions on decentralisation have 
resurfaced. Indeed, since 2014, a Select Committee report has explored ‘the case 
for local government’ in England,3 the Northern Powerhouse has taken shape,4 
and Parliament has enacted the Cities and Local Government Devolution Act 
2016. These reforms lay the foundations for greater local choice and freedom, 
departing from ‘the old model of trying to run everything … from … London’,5 
with the 2016 Act facilitating devolutionary deals between councils and 
Whitehall. Whilst fresh objectives for local invigoration are welcome, however, 
and the discussion of decentralising opportunities much needed, there can be 
understandable caution in respect of these new reforms.  
In recent years, successive governments have promised decentralisation, 
usually as a reaction to concerns that predecessors fostered a culture of 
                                                          
1 See The Smith Commission Report of the Smith Commission for further devolution of powers to the 
Scottish Parliament (Edinburgh: The Smith Commission, 2014), and the Scotland Act 2016. 
2 See Scottish Government Consultation on a Draft Referendum Bill (Edinburgh: Scottish Government, 
2016), and S Carrell, ‘Nicola Sturgeon shelves second Scottish independence referendum’ The 
Guardian 27 June 2017, available at: https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/jun/27/nicola-
sturgeon-shelves-second-independence-referendum (accessed 7 September 2017). 
3 House of Commons Communities and Local Government Select Committee Devolution in England: 
the case for local government HC 503 (London: HMSO, 2014). 
4 HM Treasury and G Osborne ‘Chancellor on building a northern powerhouse’ HM Government 14 
May 2015, available at https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/chancellor-on-building-a-northern-
powerhouse (accessed 21 March 2017). 
5 Ibid. 
centralism.6 Invariably, however, despite governments’ apparent intentions and 
the introduction of legislative provisions, attempts to decentralise have generally 
fallen short of stated promises. In part, this has been due to the piecemeal nature 
of local governmental reform, with ever-changing policy giving rise to a diversity 
of powers and structures across the country, introduced at different times, on 
occasion changing reforms brought in relatively recently.7 The result is a system 
that is inherently asymmetrical. With regards to councils’ institutional 
arrangements, for example, unitary authorities in certain parts of the country co-
exist with a two-tier structure in others; whilst the adoption of directly-elected 
mayors in certain cities operate alongside regional mayors in other parts of the 
country. More fundamentally, though, a failure to decentralise effectively means 
that councils lack power and autonomy, operating instead under close central 
supervision and tight financial restriction.8 With the realities of Brexit 
continuing to emerge, especially with the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill’s 
                                                          
6 See Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions Modern Local Government – In 
Touch with the People Cm 4014 (London: HMSO 1998) para 3.52; Department for Communities and 
Local Government Strong and Prosperous Communities: The Local Government White Paper Cm 
6939-I (London: HMSO, 2006) p 4; and Cabinet Office et al., ‘Big society speech’ HM Government 19 
July 2010, available at https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/big-society-speech (accessed 21 
March 2017).  
7 For example, the general power of competence was introduced by the Localism Act 2011 to replace 
the well-being power only 11 years after its introduction (See A Bowes and J Stanton ‘The Localism 
Act and the general power of competence’ (2014) Public Law 392). 
8 See J Stanton ‘Decentralisation and Empowerment: An empirical study of local councils in London’ 
(2015) 9 Journal of Planning and Environment Law 978. 
passage through Parliament,9 it has been argued that ‘the “take back control” 
chant of the “Leave” campaign … [is] a plea for more devolution’.10 This being the 
case, if councils are to play a part in post-Brexit Britain, facilitating devolution 
and providing local choice and freedom, then this lack of power and the 
persistence of centralised controls needs to be addressed. 
The problem, however, lies not so much in the failure of incremental 
developments to the localism agenda and the piecemeal nature of reform, but in 
the Government’s top-down approach to localism, exacerbated by the 
constitutional reality that councils are fully dependent on the centre for their 
ability to act. So long as this approach endures and regardless of government’s 
efforts to decentralise, a culture of centralism prevails. On this premise, this 
article explores how a bottom-up approach might be achieved, within the context 
of the UK Constitution, enabling councils to enjoy greater power and autonomy. 
Its emphasis is on localism in England where the central-local relationship has 
long been the focus of discussion.11 The article is structured in two sections – the 
first explains governments’ top-down approach, whilst the second discusses how 
a bottom-up approach might be achieved and protected. 
                                                          
9 At the time of writing, the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill has just passed its second reading in the 
House of Commons.  
10 D Peters ‘Devolution in the Brexit era’ (28 July 2016) The MJ 18. 
11 See J A G Griffith Central Departments and Local Authorities (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 
1966); M Loughlin Legality and Locality: The Role of Law in Central-Local Government Relations 
(Oxford: OUP, 1996); and J Stewart ‘Changing patterns of central-local relations’ (2000) 3(5) Journal 
of Local Government Law 88. 
2. THE LOCALISM PARADOX: A CULTURE OF CENTRALISM AND A TOP-
DOWN APPROACH 
(a) Localism and the nature of local government 
Localism is a broadly used and somewhat ambiguous term. Though it often 
represents social and spatial depictions of community life, it is here taken from 
the legal and political perspective.12 This ‘denotes the decentralised and 
grassroots forms of power … [and is] used in the context of subsidiarity, 
devolution and decentralisation of the state’s powers, activities and 
responsibilities downwards to local governments’.13 The value of localism, from a 
legal perspective, rests on the ability of local governmental institutions to make 
locally relevant decisions and policies, with the benefit of local knowledge and in 
preference to the imposition of a one-size-fits-all approach from the centre. As 
Mill comments:  
‘The … object of having a local representation is in order that those who 
have any interest in common which they do not share with the general 
body of their countrymen may manage that joint interest by themselves … 
There are local interests peculiar to every town … and common to all its 
inhabitants; every town, therefore … ought to have its municipal 
council’.14 
                                                          
12 S Davoudi and A Madanipour ‘Introduction’ in S Davoudi and A Madanipour (eds) Reconsidering 
Localism (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015) p 1, pp 1 – 2.  
13 Ibid, p 1. 
14 J S Mill Considerations on Representative Government (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1862) p 292. 
For further and fuller discussion of Mill’s arguments in favour of local democracy, see I Leigh Law, 
Politics, and Local Democracy (Oxford: OUP, 2000) pp 7-12. 
Localism is, in this sense, tied to the principle of subsidiarity. This demands that 
action should be taken at the lowest appropriate level of government,15 thus 
justifying local government’s place within the UK’s constitutional arrangements, 
separate from a central government that acts for the country as a whole and 
focuses on national interests.  
The significance of localism, though, is also linked to the notion of 
democratic legitimacy as it ‘involves giving … people … the right to make 
decisions on local matters’,16 local institutions providing a medium through which 
citizens can contribute to local politics. This is echoed by the Widdicombe 
Committee, which notes the value of local government as being linked to its 
pluralist nature; the platform it provides for democratic participation; and its 
responsive ‘provision of local … services’.17 This democratic value is highlighted 
by the reality that localism in England represents more than just devolution to 
local authorities. Policies and reforms have increasingly placed emphasis on 
communities, too. As Cameron noted in 2010, ‘[w]e must push power away from 
central government to local government – and we shouldn’t stop there. We should 
drive it down even further … to communities, to neighbourhoods and 
individuals’.18 Provisions of the Localism Act 2011 attempt to demonstrate the 
fruits of this promise; these are explored below.  
                                                          
15 See Article 5(3) Treaty on European Union. 
16 V Bogdanor The New British Constitution (Oxford: OUP, 2009) p 235. 
17 D Widdicombe The Conduct of Local Authority Business: Report of the Committee of Inquiry into 
the Conduct of Local Authority Business Cmnd 9797 (London: HMSO,1986) para 3.11 and ch 3, as 
cited in Leigh, above n 14, pp 5-6. 
18 Cabinet Office et al, above n 6.  
The principle of localism, then, is a positive one. As ‘an alternative source 
of authority to the central state’,19 it promotes local action and citizen 
engagement as tools of good governance and democracy, and involves the pursuit 
of efficient, effective and democratic leadership and decision-making, for the good 
of a local area.20 With this in mind, the purpose of local government in England 
is, in one manner, extremely simple. It provides this governance, leadership and 
decision-making to local areas, carrying the mandate of local people and 
providing services to those areas. It is, in this sense, government on a local 
level.21 Supporting this observation, King notes: 
‘The word government in the phrase local government carries with it at 
least two connotations. One is autonomy. To say that an entity is a 
government is to imply that there is a sphere of activity within which it 
can expect its decisions to be carried out. The body in question is, within 
its own sphere, autonomous and the supreme authority’.22 
The difficulty arises, however, when we consider the legal nature of local 
government. Loughlin explains: 
‘In law, local authorities are statutory corporations which are dependent 
on powers given to them by statute for their ability to act; the doctrine of 
                                                          
19 Leigh, above n 14, p 7. 
20 See H Atkinson Local democracy, civic engagement and community: From New Labour to the Big 
Society (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2012). 
21 See I Jennings Principles of Local Government Law (London: University of London Press Ltd, 4th 
edn, 1960) p 2. 
22 A King The British Constitution (Oxford: OUP, 2007) p 151. The other connotation, not relevant to 
this discussion, is the scope of governmental activity (pp 151-2).  
ultra vires exists to ensure that they keep within their statutory powers 
and are accountable to the courts; and central departments of state 
possess a range of powers enabling them to influence the manner in which 
local authorities conduct their affairs’.23 
Councils, therefore, are dependent upon parliamentary authority for everything 
that they do, they do not possess residual discretionary powers and cannot act 
beyond the limits of appropriate authority, incurring the jurisdiction of the 
Administrative Court if they seek to do so.24 More than this, local government 
owes its very existence to statute – legislation, susceptible to ordinary repeal and 
amendment, provides the legal framework for local government and means, 
therefore, that councils enjoy no special constitutional status.25  
Awareness of councils’ legal nature and the limitation this imposes on 
their ability freely to act for local areas was at the heart of the Localism Act’s 
general power of competence.26 This empowers local authorities ‘to do anything 
that individuals … may do’,27 and is designed to reverse the ‘assumption’ that 
                                                          
23 M Loughlin Local Government in the Modern State (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1986) pp 1-2. 
24 See S H Bailey Cross on Principles of Local Government Law (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 3rd edn, 
2004) paras 1-20, cited in M Varney ‘United Kingdom – Local government in England: Localism 
delivered?’ in C Panara and M Varney (eds) Local Government in Europe: The ‘fourth level’ in the EU 
multilayered system of governance (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015) p 330, p 335. 
25 See S Bailey and M Elliott ‘Taking local government seriously: democracy, autonomy and the 
constitution’ (2009) 68(2) Cambridge Law Journal 436 at 441. 
26 See Department for Communities and Local Government A plain English Guide to the Localism Act 
(London: DCLG, 2011) p 4. 
27 Localism Act 2011, s 1(1). 
councils are limited by the extent of their statutory powers.28 The Government 
intended that ‘[i]nstead of being able to act only where the law says they can, 
local authorities will be freed to do anything - provided they do not break other 
laws’.29 The discretion this provision affords, however, is not unfettered; it is set 
out by statute with express limits on its use, meaning it falls short of establishing 
any residual discretionary power for local government.30 
The premise of local government’s legal nature is not flawed so much as 
the consequences of it. Its existence as a statutory corporation means that, due to 
the constitutional framework within which it operates, it will forever be 
‘subordinate to some higher governmental authority’,31 often requiring the 
approval or encouragement of central departments before it can act.32 This 
inferiority, though, also brings the potential for overly-prescriptive, centralised 
supervision, often at the whim of prevailing political themes in Whitehall. This 
concern is the inspiration for this article, with the government’s centralist 
approach towards councils meaning that stated objectives and promises, aligned 
with the principle of localism, are often not realised to their full extent, as the 
next section discusses. 
                                                          
28 Department for Communities and Local Government, above n 26, p 4. 
29 Ibid, p 4. 
30 Localism Act 2011, s.2. See Bowes and Stanton, above n 7, at 397-401. 
31 Jennings, above n 21, p 2. 
32 Griffith, above n 11, p 18. 
(b) A top-down approach to local government 
Localism manifests itself in two forms: substantive localism refers to the 
empowerment of local institutions through provisions setting out local power, 
whilst procedural localism denotes the broader process within which that power 
is facilitated and allowed to be exercised.33 Both of these aspects must be 
satisfied if the objectives of localism are to be achieved; one cannot operate 
without the other insofar as the provision of local governmental power is 
meaningless if the lack of an appropriate procedural framework prevents councils 
freely exercising that power in their own specific ways. In England, procedural 
localism is lacking. This section shows that, whilst recent governments have 
provided substantive legislative provisions intended to empower local councils, 
the predominance of a top-down approach hinders the realisation of procedural 
localism and means, therefore, that the substantive element is undermined. 
A fundamental criticism of the Governments’ approach to localism is that 
the principle is taken as requiring fulfilment of objectives at the central level. In 
2011, a government report identified localism as entailing six actions: to lift the 
burden of bureaucracy; to empower communities; to increase local control of 
public finance; to diversify the supply of public services; to open up government 
                                                          
33 Bailey and Elliott also identify two ‘conditions’ of localism: ‘First, local authorities must possess 
sufficient power, independence and financial resources to govern in a way which is distinctive, 
meeting the … needs of their areas and … expectations of their citizenry … Second, the quality of local 
democracy must … enable the participation of individuals, vouchsafe the responsiveness of local 
institutions and remove the need … for a high level of central interference in the business of local 
government” (above n 25, at 439). I am grateful to Professor Mark Elliott for his thoughts, which have 
helped develop this section. 
to public scrutiny; and to strengthen local accountability.34 Though good in 
principle, these are framed as actions for central government to facilitate and 
implement localism, rather than objectives led by councils, suggesting a 
unilateral exercise where everything comes from Whitehall. The Government’s 
approach to localism, therefore, can be categorised as top-down. Such an 
observation is not novel;35 nor is it a new problem but one long-embedded in the 
central-local relationship. Indeed, in recent years, ‘[o]ne of the major purposes of 
local government has been to deliver services that central government … has not 
wished to manage directly’.36 Rather than seeing councils as autonomous 
institutions, capable of exercising discretionary authority for their areas, they are 
instead seen as extensions of Whitehall’s reach; puppets for the implementation 
of centralised policies and ‘instrument[s] of the centre’.37 
A consequence of this top-down approach is a centralist theme in 
legislation designed to implement ostensibly localist objectives. Legislation, 
sponsored by recent governments, though appearing to set out increased power 
for local authorities – and, in this sense, satisfying substantive localism – in 
reality ensures retention of authority at Whitehall to the extent that government 
                                                          
34 House of Commons Communities and Local Government Select Committee Localism HC 547 
(London: HMSO, 2011) p 16. 
35 See R Hambleton ‘The overseas experience with political management in local government’ (1999) 
2(6) Journal of Local Government Law 125 at 126; V Jenkins ‘Local government reform and 
sustainable development in Wales and Ireland’ (2009) 11(1) Environmental Law Review 21 at 23. 
36 Bailey and Elliott, above n 25, at 442. 
37 Loughlin, above n 11, p 50. 
is able to supervise and prescribe the manner in which local power should be 
exercised; thus falling short of procedural localism.   
The Localism Act 2011, for example, was introduced as effecting ‘a power 
shift away from central government’,38 giving autonomy to the people and their 
communities. It formed part of the Big Society initiative, which included a focus 
on devolution amidst a planned reduction of the state to tackle economic 
austerity.39 Reflecting this, early drafts of the bill proposed giving ‘power to 
residents to hold local referendums on any local issue’,40 a move that was, at first 
glance, indicative of a bottom-up approach. (It is notable that this power was 
later removed from the bill). In reality, though, the 2011 Act created a number of 
new powers for the Secretary of State and made extensive provision for 
centralised supervision of a range of local matters.41 It introduced, for instance, a 
requirement for referenda to be held whenever a local authority seeks to increase 
the council tax level above a limit approved by Parliament.42 Though motivated 
                                                          
38 HM Government Decentralisation and the Localism Bill: an essential guide (London: HMSO, 2010) 
p 1. 
39 See M J Smith ‘From Big Government to Big Society: Changing the State – Society Balance’ (2010) 
63 (4) Parliamentary Affairs 818. Also see Cabinet Office et al, above n 6.  
40 Conservative Party Control shift: returning power to local communities (2009) p 21, as cited in M 
Sandford Local government: polls and referendums Briefing Paper, Number 03409 (London: House of 
Commons Library, 2016) p 6. This provision required that 5 per cent of local citizens sign a petition in 
favour of a referendum within a 6-month period. 
41 See G Jones and J Stewart ‘Local government: the past, the present and the future’ (2012) 27(4) 
Public Policy and Administration 346 at 355-356. 
42 Localism Act 2011, s 72(1) and Sch 5.  
by a desire to ensure local control of budgets, in reality it is ‘government that sets 
the parameters for the referendums by stipulating … the amount of council tax 
increase deemed to be excessive’.43 A top-down approach is also evident in the 
Act’s ‘community rights’ and neighbourhood planning reforms. These were 
introduced to enable communities to take the initiative in developing local areas, 
also affording them the opportunity ‘to take over the running of public services’.44 
The Act, however, gives the Secretary of State an overriding say in determining 
whether a council is permitted to take over a particular service,45 whilst the 
changes to neighbourhood planning – accompanied as those were by the National 
Planning and Policy Framework – include requirements that community plans 
comply with centralised policy.46 The Localism Act is thus littered with 
provisions that ensure governmental supervision of various local authority 
activities, exemplifying this top-down approach. Indeed: 
‘The Act is so dominated by this centralist culture that it could well have 
been called the Centralism Act … It is ironic that a Localism Act contains 
                                                          
43 I Leigh ‘The Changing Nature of the Local State’ in J Jowell, D Oliver and C O’Cinneide (eds) The 
Changing Constitution (Oxford: OUP, 8th edn, 2015) p 279, p 292. 
44 See J Stanton ‘The Big Society and Community Development: Neighbourhood planning under the 
Localism Act’ (2014) 16(4) Environmental Law Review 262 at 265 and 270. 
45 Localism Act 2011, Pt V, Ch 2, and Explanatory Notes to the Localism Act, paras 219 – 223. 
46 Department for Communities and Local Government National Planning and Policy Framework 
(London: DCLG, 2012) p 2, citing Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004, ss 19(2)(a) and 38(6), 
and Town and Country Planning Act 1990, s 70(2), and cited in Stanton, above n 44 at 267 – 8. Also 
see Localism Act 2011, Pt VI, Ch 3, and Stanton, above n 44 at 269. 
so many means by which central government can prescribe how local 
authorities’ powers are to be used and the criteria to be applied to them’.47  
Centralised prescription and supervision is also evident from other legislative 
examples. The Health and Social Care Act 2012, for instance, enacts a policy that 
sees ‘[u]pper tier and unitary local authorities … taking on critical public health 
responsibilities’.48 Whilst indicative of a willingness to trust councils with public 
service provision, the Act contains numerous sections ensuring the centre can 
supervise councils’ work in this area. The Secretary of State, for instance, has the 
power to prescribe how councils carry out their functions, and he can issue 
guidance to which local authorities must have regard.49 What is more, in view of 
announcements in 2015 that public health budgets were to be cut by £200 
million, provisions of the 2012 Act could be seen as forcing councils to deal with 
the challenges of austerity, saving Whitehall the difficult decisions.50 
This top-down approach is also evident in reforms dating back to Labour’s 
time in government, suggesting it has long been embedded in the central-local 
relationship. The Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 
2009, for instance, imposed a duty on councils to make provision for the holding 
                                                          
47 Jones and Stewart, above n 41, at 356 and 358. 
48 Department of Health Public Health in Local Government: The new public health role of local 
authorities (London: Department of Health, 2012) p 2. 
49 See ibid, p 2. Also see Health and Social Care Act 2012, ss 30 – 32. 
50 See N Merrifield ‘Health visitor budget cuts ‘open’ to councils in public health savings drive’ 
Nursing Times 31 July 2015, available at http://www.nursingtimes.net/clinical-subjects/public-
health/consultation-begins-on-200m-cuts-to-public-health-budget/5089335.fullarticle (accessed 22 
March 2017). 
of and response to local petitions,51 with the intention of encouraging greater 
local discretion and empowering communities to influence local politics.52 The 
Act, though, also gave central government the power to prescribe ‘when local 
petitions could be held, the form they should take and the requirements 
necessary for them to be entertained by a local authority’,53 enabling the centre to 
direct how powers designed for local innovation should be utilised. Going further 
back, the Local Government Act 2000 introduced a now largely abolished well-
being power that enabled councils to do anything they considered likely to 
promote the economic, social and environmental well-being of their areas,54 
seemingly giving them broad scope to engage and work with communities.55 Far 
from enabling local authorities to ‘develop … meaningful … community 
leadership role[s]’,56 however, the power appeared simply to require councils to 
contribute to objectives pertaining to sustainable development to which 
                                                          
51 Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009, ss 10 – 22. 
52 See Hansard HL Deb, vol 706, col 850, 17 December 2008. 
53 J Stanton Democratic Sustainability in a New Era of Localism (Abingdon: Routledge-Earthscan, 
2014) p 88, citing J Stanton ‘Localism in action?’ UK Constitutional Law Association 14 March 2013, 
available at http://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2013/03/14/john-stanton-localism-in-action/ (accessed 22 
March 2017). 
54 Local Government Act 2000, s 2(1). The power remains in force in Wales (Localism Act 2011, Sch 
1).  
55 S Cirell ‘The modernisation of local government and its impact on planning’ (2003) Journal of 
Planning and Environment Law (Supplement: Occasional Papers No 31) 1 at 10 – 11. 
56 P Swann ‘Local government: the modernizing agenda’ (2000) Journal of Planning and Environment 
Law (Supplement) 9 at 13, cited in Bowes and Stanton, above n 7, at 394.  
government was at that time particularly committed.57 These various examples, 
therefore, demonstrate the extent of central government’s top-down approach to 
localism. Though each Act sets out powers appearing to decentralise, their 
provisions contain localist objectives that are enforced at the centre, on 
centralised terms and with centrally imposed restrictions. In this way, whilst 
substantive localism appears satisfied, procedural localism is not.  
This top-down approach, though, is also evident from recent government 
policy. In dealing with a lack of affordable housing in London, for instance, 
central government recently directed funds towards the subsidisation of private 
landlords, against the wishes of councillors, who would rather have used the 
money to build new homes.58 Limited local control of finances and a heavily 
restricted budget is a factor underpinning this culture of centralism. Ryan 
observes that UK ‘councils raise only 25 per cent of their own revenue, with the 
majority of it … being supplied by the centre’.59 This has recently been 
exacerbated by initiatives aimed at tackling austerity, which have imposed 
drastic cuts on the sector. Indeed, ‘data shows that total government funding to 
local authorities fell by 27.9 per cent over the 2010 spending review period, 2010-
                                                          
57 V Jenkins ‘Learning from the past: achieving sustainable development in the reform of local 
government’ (2002) Public Law 130 at 141. The economic, social and environmental objectives of the 
well-being power mirror the three-pillars of sustainable development. This is discussed further at: 
Stanton, above n 53, pp 19 – 20. For judicial limitation of the well-being power, see R (Brent LBC) v 
Risk Management Partners [2009] EWCA Civ 490.  
58 Stanton, above n 8, at 982. 
59 M Ryan ‘Central-local government relations and the UK constitution’ (2009) 14(1) Coventry Law 
Journal 20 at 21, citing House of Commons Communities and Local Government Select Committee 
The Balance of Power: Central and Local Government HC 33-I (London: HMSO, 2009) p 35.  
11 to 2014-15’, with ‘[p]rovisional figures suggest[ing] that by 2015-16 there … 
[would] have been a total reduction of 37.3 per cent’.60 It is pertinent to question 
how councils can make use of devolved powers if they are simultaneously having 
to manage reductions in budgets and operate with little money to go beyond their 
statutory duties. Whilst recent reforms aim to increase local financial autonomy, 
these bring their own problems, which the article now explores.  
(c) The Northern Powerhouse and the 2016 Act: a change in approach? 
The reforms promoted by the current Government have, since 2015, been 
intended to reflect a changed approach to local government. The Northern 
Powerhouse has been hailed as ‘a revolution in the way we govern England’, 
appreciative ‘that the old model of trying to run everything … from … London is 
broken’.61 Alongside this, the Cities and Local Government Devolution Act 2016 
has been lauded as promoting a bottom-up approach to localism, with councils 
being invited to agree devolutionary proposals with central government.62 Also 
heralded as a means of rebalancing the economy, these deals are seen as bringing 
fiscal devolution to the English regions, intending to give councils greater 
financial autonomy. Indeed, even before the Act, it was announced that by 2020 
councils will be allowed to keep all the proceeds from local business rates. 
Osborne explains: ‘[a]ttract a business, and you attract more money. Regenerate 
a high street, and you’ll reap the benefits. Grow your area, and you’ll grow your 
                                                          
60 National Audit Office Local government report by the Comptroller and Auditor General: The impact 
of funding reductions on local authorities (London: NAO, 2014) para 1.4. 
61 HM Treasury and G Osborne, above n 4. 
62 Hansard HC Deb, vol 603, col 822, 7 December 2015. 
revenue’.63 This is seen alongside aforementioned changes to council tax as a 
shift away from reliance on central money and an attempted increase in councils’ 
ability to raise income for themselves, a move that is further emphasised by the 
announcement of cuts to various government grants.64 
At this early stage, however, examination of the new reforms suggests 
that the underlying attitude towards localism remains unchanged, with 
considerable authority still retained at Whitehall. Government intervention in a 
decision to proceed with fracking near Blackpool, for instance, against the 
decision of the council and the wishes of local people, is indicative of this 
unchanged approach.65 But there are concerns about the 2016 Act, too. Whilst 
promoted as an instrument through which councils can instigate change, there 
are fears that the Act still enables government to impose changes on local 
authorities. It is up to the Secretary of State, for instance, to bring about 
                                                          
63 G Osborne ‘The Chancellor’s speech to Conservative Party Conference 2015’ Conservative Party 5 
October 2015, available at http://press.conservatives.com/post/130748611145/the-chancellors-speech-
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to keep £26bn in business rates’ BBC News 5 October 2015, available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-34445311 (accessed 22 March 2017). 
64 See Department for Communities and Local Government and G Clark ‘Final local government 
finance settlement 2016 to 2017’ HM Government 8 February 2016, available at 
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devolution and be responsible for agreeing deals with councils.66 He also has the 
power to make regulations affecting the governance, membership and structural 
arrangements of local authorities, at times with minimal consent from those 
involved.67 This concern carries weight when the realities of the Northern 
Powerhouse in Manchester are considered. Here, contrary to views expressed in a 
recent referendum,68 the decision to establish a combined authority, overseen by 
a directly-elected mayor, was the result of a deal struck by George Osborne with 
local politicians, the first interim mayor appointed – not elected – in May 2015.69 
More widely, it is noteworthy that devolution under the 2016 Act will only be 
                                                          
66 See Local Government Association ‘Briefing: Cities and Local Government Devolution Bill, Second 
Reading, House of Lords’ Local Government Association 8 June 2015, available at 
http://www.local.gov.uk/documents/10180/11607/2015+06+08+Cities+and+Local+Government+Devo
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possible where combined authorities70 either move to unitary status,71 or adopt a 
directly-elected mayor; a model of governance that local people have consistently 
rejected.72 Indeed, government further motivates adoption of this unpopular 
model by establishing the exclusive right of councils led by directly-elected 
mayors the power to increase business rates and thus council income.73 This 
highlights another centralist concern insofar as greater autonomy is seemingly 
afforded to those councils willing to accept the centre’s prescribed arrangements. 
The constitutional significance of the 2016 Act thus ‘depends on how the raft of 
powers … that accrue to the Secretary of State are deployed in practice’.74 Going 
forward, it is important that the Government expatiate more clearly how far the 
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74 Hansard HL Deb, vol 762, col 654, 8 June 2015. 
Secretary of State can go in deciding the powers to be devolved and the 
structures councils should adopt as part of that devolution.75 Finally, local 
retention of business rates also presents cause for concern as it risks benefiting 
certain councils over others, meaning that authorities could suffer at the hands of 
a one-size-fits-all approach.76 Indeed, the policy must be seen in the context of the 
March 2016 budget, which announced cuts to local business rates,77 adding 
weight to the suggestion that Government at times devolves financial cuts to 
minimise the effect on the centre. Whilst underpinned by promises lauding the 
benefits of a bottom-up approach, therefore, the new policies and 2016 Act inspire 
familiar concern that it is yet more local reform on central terms and with 
centrally imposed restrictions. 
The top-down approach to localism, therefore, has long been embedded in 
the way government engages with councils. Whilst substantive localism has been 
achieved, by the introduction of provisions seeking to empower councils with local 
autonomy, the persistence of centralised controls at the heart of those provisions 
and policies means that they fall short of procedural localism by failing to provide 
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the framework necessary to ensure that decentralised power can be exercised 
appropriately. The leader of Westminster City Council observes, ‘we have the 
powers to do really quite a lot if we want to. The issue is that we do not have the 
… freedom to spend our money the way we might want’.78  
That a top-down approach is contrary to the principle of localism goes 
without saying. The value of ‘decentralised and grassroots forms of power’79 is 
lost if central government can exert excessive control over the way local powers 
are exercised. Whilst the realities of the unitary constitution must be kept in 
mind, if government is too prescriptive over what councils are able to do, a one-
size-fits-all approach can result and mean that councils are not able to use local 
powers for the good of their areas. They become less ‘an alternative source of 
authority to the central state’,80 and more an extension of Whitehall’s reach over 
policy areas that should be left to councils to manage: ‘a top-down, one-size-fits-
all approach is contrary to the spirit of greater devolution’.81 More than this, 
though, government’s overly prescriptive involvement in local affairs hinders the 
effective use of power, damages local democracy and means that local concerns 
often remain unresolved. In part, this is ‘because central government is remote 
from the actual issues being faced locally’;82 but more fundamentally it is because 
                                                          
78 House of Commons Communities and Local Government Select Committee, above n 59, para 62. 
79 Davoudi and Madanipour, above n 12, p 1. 
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81 A Bowes and M Purdue ‘Former DCLG permanent secretary criticises Government housing policies’ 
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prescriptive centralised supervision of local activity prevents councils from using 
powers intended to facilitate innovation in locally unique ways, affecting their 
ability to ‘manage … local interests peculiar to every town’.83 Demonstrating this, 
an empirical study in London found that government’s prescriptive supervision of 
councils ‘impacts heavily on attempts to decentralise as where government does 
push power down, “it comes with more bureaucracy, which just makes life 
harder”’.84 Indeed, one councillor noted: ‘our Minister for Local Government … 
[tells] us to do things on [a] micro level … it should be local decisions, they 
shouldn’t be anything to do with him … it just completely contradicts … 
localism’.85  
This section has explored the Government’s top-down approach to 
localism. Where attempts are made at decentralisation, a culture of centralism 
persists through provisions ensuring government retain an overriding say in how 
councils function and how far they can go in governing local areas. This is 
problematic, not only in terms of undermining localism, but also in terms of 
influencing the strength of local democracy, the appropriate allocation of power 
and the effectiveness with which local issues can be addressed by those elected 
for that purpose. The article goes on later to make the case for a bottom-up 
approach to localism. First, however, it considers the reasons underpinning this 
culture of centralism.  
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(d) The underlying reason: a question of trust or a democratic issue? 
There is an episode of the 1980s comedy show, Yes, Prime Minister, in which 
Cabinet Secretary, Sir Humphrey Appleby, explains to Principal Private 
Secretary, Bernard Woolley, the perils of local democracy. Discussing how best to 
develop a hypothetical plot of land in far-away Nottingham, Humphrey lauds the 
‘fruitful’ work that can be achieved at the centre and warns of the dangers of 
taking power away from Whitehall and affording those proximate to Nottingham 
a role in the process; describing the latter as ‘amateurs’.86 ‘If the right people 
don’t have power … the wrong people get it … Councillors, [and] ordinary voters’, 
he explains.87 Whilst this article in no way suggests that such an extreme, 
comedic view of localism underpins the centre’s current attitude towards local 
democracy, and putting fictitious references aside, questions of government’s 
trust in local authorities does raise a pertinent issue. The persistently centralist 
tendencies of government have been attributed to a lack of trust in local 
government, evidenced by some of the examples explored above. Requiring 
neighbourhood plans to conform with centralised policy, for instance, or giving 
the Secretary of State for Health a directing say in the way councils fulfil their 
public health obligations – to name just two – are not indicative of a government 
that bestows a wealth of confidence in its councils always to take the most 
appropriate action.  
Identification of a lack of trust giving rise to centralist tendencies is not a 
novel observation. Loughlin notes that ‘[i]n the … system which … emerged in 
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the 1990s there is little room for any sense of trust … the Government has forged 
a hierarchical central-local relationship based on precise powers and duties. 
Discretion has been replaced by rules and the primary form of law has shifted 
from a facilitative to directive style of law’.88 This has paved the way for ‘broad 
central powers of supervision’89 and the culture of centralism described above. 
The practical effects of this are described by Jones and Stewart, who suggest that 
the 2011 Localism ‘Act is based on the assumption that empowering communities 
and local government requires central-government prescription … because it 
distrusts local government’.90 Indeed, as the Leader of Camden Borough Council 
also notes, ‘our frustration … is not so much about the powers that we have … we 
do not seem to be trusted to run our affairs’.91  
Beyond these questions of trust, there is another factor underpinning this 
culture of centralism; one linked to democratic legitimacy. The aforementioned 
top-down approach to localism exists alongside a long-standing problem 
regarding democratic interest in local government. Turnout at local elections is 
historically very low: the 47.5 per cent turnout recorded in 1990 reflects a 
highpoint in recent decades; in other years fewer than 30 per cent cast their 
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89 Loughlin, ibid, p 262. 
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vote.92 With so few people apparently interested in local politics it is hardly 
surprising that government seems reluctant to decentralise power to councils 
established on rocky democratic foundations. The participative and responsive93  
potential of local government is undermined if its democratically representative 
nature is weak. Reasons underpinning low turnout have been explored elsewhere 
and are not replicated here.94 It is argued, though, that there is a circuitous 
connection between the lack of popular engagement and this top-down approach. 
‘[S]uccessive central government policies … that have sought to restrict the role 
of local government and reduce its autonomy have weakened local democratic 
accountability … in turn encourag[ing] the seepage of power to the centre, which 
further reduces electoral choice and local accountability’.95 Though some have 
argued that increased opportunity for community participation could improve 
voter interest in local government,96 realisation of a bottom-up approach might 
also contribute to the correction of this apathy, and restore voter confidence in 
councils.  
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Whether deriving from a lack of trust in councils, low turnouts or councils’ 
constitutional position, this top-down approach is problematic, as the first section 
of this article has explored. It is important to consider, therefore, how a bottom-
up approach might be implemented, free from prescriptive supervision at the 
centre, as the next section discusses.  
3. A BOTTOM-UP APPROACH TO LOCALISM 
In order that a bottom-up approach to localism might be realised, a fundamental 
shift in the central-local relationship needs to be effected. This section explores 
the basis for this shift, explaining what a bottom-up approach might look like, 
before discussing how it can be achieved within the existing constitutional 
framework. 
(a) What is a bottom-up approach and what should it look like? 
Bottom-up localism is associated with ‘a bid for autonomy by … lower 
[authorities]’, 97 and means that the process of local government – decision-
making, policy implementation and governance – is led by local institutions and 
local people, rather than supervised and prescribed from the centre. It is 
consistent with the principle of localism insofar as it is dependent upon 
autonomous councils,98 acting separately and independently from the centre,99 
and exercising decentralised power,100 freedom and autonomy for their local 
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areas. It is also justified by Mill, who states that ‘all business purely local – all 
which concerns only a single locality – should devolve upon the local 
authorities’.101 In this sense, a bottom-up approach is linked to subsidiarity, on 
the basis of which ‘a larger and higher ranking body should not exercise functions 
which could be efficiently carried out by a smaller or lesser body’.102 In the 
context of this discussion, this means that central government should not 
exercise powers or carry out functions that would be better exercised or fulfilled 
by local government. On this basis, and if successfully applied:  
‘Subsidiarity [could] pave the way for a system of governance in which 
different levels of power can work together on a functional basis, each 
playing a role in a hierarchical organisation. A degree of autonomy is … 
offered to the lower levels of authority while maintaining the control 
exerted by the higher levels’.103  
The relevance of subsidiarity in these terms is especially pertinent since the 
notion of ‘different levels of power’ working together within a structural 
hierarchy indicates the institutional framework within which a bottom-up 
approach could operate in England. Though this article is rightly critical of the 
prescriptive supervision and interference that has come to typify Whitehall’s 
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and Davoudi, pp 15-16). 
103 Madanipour and Davoudi, ibid, p 17, citing D Cass ‘The word that saves Maastricht? The principle 
of subsidiarity and the division of powers within the European Community’ (1992) 29(6) Common 
Market Law Review 1107. 
dealings with local authorities, it is equally mindful of the unitary nature of the 
Constitution and the fact that councils, as statutory corporations, cannot function 
without the appropriate allocation of powers from the centre. Indeed, and whilst 
pursuit of this bottom-up approach is a reaction against a one-size-fits-all 
approach to local government, uniformity of policy is, to a degree, a necessary 
part of our unitary system.  
Bottom-up localism is also strengthened by the democratic legitimacy, 
which lies at the heart of the localism principle, and that derives from the 
platform councils provide for local engagement in the process of decision-making 
and service provision.104 This value can be seen from Labour’s New Deal for 
Communities programme, for example, which was established as a community-
led neighbourhood renewal project in the late 1990s. Though it was affected by 
familiar concerns for centralisation and poor engagement, research showed that 
where the bottom-up nature was embraced it created opportunities for local 
democratic activity from which neighbourhoods could benefit.105 More recently, 
the Big Society was underpinned by rhetoric supportive of a bottom-up approach, 
realised in part by initiatives concerned with the running of community services 
by local, non-state actors.106 Though an extension of this sees local government 
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being potentially relegated to having a residual function, something that is 
inconsistent with the democratic legitimacy it commands and the constitutional 
role it fulfils, bottom-up projects born out of the Big Society, such as 
neighbourhood planning and community rights, have been seen to inspire greater 
democratic interest in local affairs.107 Recalling aforementioned concerns 
regarding low-turnouts in local elections and a broader disengagement with local 
politics, a bottom-up approach could therefore improve democratic interest, as 
citizens might feel more inclined to vote for and engage with councils that can 
exercise greater autonomy for their local areas.  
A bottom-up approach, therefore, is consistent with the principle of 
localism. In terms of considering how it might work in practice, however, it could 
take effect by central government, with Parliament, legislating to provide the 
broad framework within which councils should exercise local discretion and 
autonomy, thereafter allowing councils independently and freely to act for the 
good of their areas and to exist as more than mere satellites of the centre. This 
would be consistent with their democratic ‘ability to make decisions based on 
their own judgement’,108 correcting the top-down approach explained above and 
tilting ‘the balance of power between central and local government … towards 
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localities’.109 In terms of how this approach might be implemented in practice, 
however, it would not be enough merely to amend existing legislation to do away 
with centralising provisions and introduce new statutes correcting this approach; 
more fundamental change is needed, as the next section explores.  
(b) Achieving a bottom-up approach to local government 
This article has already identified the incremental and piecemeal nature of 
recent local reform. New governments come in with fresh agendas, changing 
political policy and often giving rise to new reforms. The Localism Act, for 
instance, superseded and undid certain aspects of Labour’s local governmental 
model, whilst the 2016 Act sees another change in direction. Governments, with 
their parliamentary majority, promote Acts that bring change to local 
government and impose new political visions on councils, leading to the top-down 
approach described above. As Butler et al note, the ‘freedom of a government with 
a subservient Parliament … [can redefine] the role of local government without 
any semblance of its consent’.110  
The argument is made, on this basis, that ordinary legislation is too 
susceptible to repeal to provide the foundation for any long-term, bottom-up 
approach to local government. As this section explores, what is needed is a 
political agreement, underpinned and protected by legislative provision. 
Combining political and legal mechanisms as a basis for decentralisation is, of 
course, reminiscent of the devolution settlements set up with Scotland, Wales 
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and Northern Ireland in 1998. Though this section draws parallels with these 
where appropriate, it is also mindful that we are dealing with very different 
constitutional institutions, those at Edinburgh, Cardiff and Belfast enjoying both 
greater democratic legitimacy and a clearer relationship with Whitehall.111 With 
this in mind, this section now discusses the political and legal mechanisms 
necessary to ensure a bottom-up approach.  
(i) Political agreement and a central-local concordat 
The first step to achieving a bottom-up approach must come in the form of 
political agreement between central and local government. That is, agreement on 
the allocation of power and the expectations of both parties in how that power 
should be exercised. Political agreement is important as it means nothing is 
imposed by central government, but approved by both parties with a greater 
sense of equality. Drawing from previous examples in UK Constitutional Law, 
this political agreement could come in the form of a central-local concordat. 
Concordats are relatively recent developments, emerging, for instance, ‘as a 
device for co-ordinating UK governance in the wake of devolution to Scotland, 
Wales and Northern Ireland’.112 In this use, they can be defined as  
‘agreements between … Government and the devolved administrations … 
[that] stipulate the procedures and rules to be followed … for effecting co-
operation and co-ordination in policy processes characterised by shared 
competence … or with respect to policies where the actions of one 
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administration will impact on the policy environment of the other 
administration’.113 
Concordats, therefore, facilitate agreement in the face of competing principles.114 
Though in the devolutionary settlements these were parliamentary sovereignty 
on the one hand, and the devolution of power on the other,115 in the context of 
localism, a concordat could be used to find consensus in ensuring greater power 
and autonomy for local government, against the centralist tendencies of 
Whitehall. 
The idea of concordats policing the central-local relationship is not new. In 
2007, a concordat was agreed between central government and the Local 
Government Association (LGA), the latter acting on behalf of councils across 
Britain.116 This reflected agreement on a number of issues, including a reduction 
in centralised interference; the need to give ‘councils greater flexibility in their 
funding’; and a presumption in favour of subsidiarity.117 Despite its good 
intentions, however, the 2007 Concordat ‘quickly fell into disuse’.118 Critics 
highlight the fact that it was agreed ‘only by the DCLG and the LGA’; that ‘it had 
                                                          
113 Ibid, at 21. 
114 Ibid, at 21, citing V Bogdanor ‘Constitutional Reform in the UK’ (paper presented at the Centre for 
Public Law, University of Cambridge, January 1998). 
115 Bogdanor, ibid, cited in Scott, ibid, p 21. 
116 See N Headlam The Central-Local Concordat SN/PC/04713 (London: House of Commons Library, 
2008). 
117 Ibid, p 2. 
118 House of Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Select Committee Prospects for codifying 
the relationship between central and local government HC 656-I (London: HMSO, 2013) p 10.  
no legal force’;119 and that it lacked any meaningful substance.120 As such, it 
failed to establish a constitutional foundation upon which local government could 
thrive and develop.121 
Concordats, though, are not the only form of political agreement, with 
devolutionary deals, such as those central to the Northern Powerhouse policy and 
the 2016 Act, also facilitating consensus between localities and Whitehall. It has 
already been noted, though, that these are similarly reflective of centralist 
tendencies. The Secretary of State, for instance, carries great weight in 
determining the powers to be devolved, whilst the deal in Manchester was agreed 
privately by George Osborne and local politicians. These concerns are indicative 
of a potential problem in rooting a central-local relationship in political 
agreement, namely that consensus is, first and foremost, struck privately 
between elected politicians, with affected citizens disconnected from the process. 
This leads to the danger that any consequent agreement might exist merely as a 
point of reference for officials across different levels of government to facilitate 
local governance behind closed doors, potentially hindering, rather than helping, 
the realisation of any democratically supported activity. If future local 
governmental reform is to start with another concordat, therefore, there are a 
number of mistakes that cannot be repeated and issues to take into 
consideration. The need for more widespread representation of the agreement is 
obvious. Whilst the LGA is well placed to represent local authorities countrywide, 
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central government should be represented by more than merely the Department 
for Communities and Local Government, and should engage with the concordat 
such that it binds ‘Whitehall as a whole’.122 Policies across government impact on 
localism, so all departments should be united in the consensus. In addition, legal 
recognition would also be crucial to the success of any concordat. Though existing 
constitutional arrangements and parliamentary sovereignty present their own 
challenges, grounding an agreement in law could ensure clearer and stronger 
boundaries between central and local power. Finally, any agreement between 
central and local government on the way powers are allocated and exercised must 
have the support of those affected by such powers, that is, the public. Any 
concordat, therefore, should be democratically legitimised and endorsed by 
popular consent. The next section explores the issue of legal recognition; this one 
goes on to consider democratic legitimacy and the substance of a potential 
concordat.  
This article has already identified a circuitous connection between the top-
down approach to localism and low levels of local democratic engagement. If a 
bottom-up approach is to ‘contribute to the correction of this apathy’, as has been 
suggested above, then affording citizens a role in shaping that approach, by 
providing opportunities to endorse the proposed political agreement, could be a 
step towards invigorating greater popular interest in local politics.  This might be 
presented by a referendum123 or a consultation exercise where information about 
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the concordat is made publicly available, along with opportunities for discussions. 
Whilst merely facilitating increased democratic participation is unlikely to rectify 
problems with apathy and engagement on its own, promoting the fundamental 
nature of the reforms to which the public are being invited to contribute (i.e. a 
new relationship between central and local government, defined by a bottom-up 
approach) could help turn the tide.124  
Considering, now, the content of a potential concordat, the criticism, 
above, that the 2007 Concordat lacked meaningful substance refers to the fact 
that ‘it [did] not establish a realm of matters – analogous to the category of 
devolved matters for which devolved governments are … responsible – which are 
the constitutional preserve of local authorities’.125 Keeping in mind that a 
central-local concordat would seek to balance central power with the need for 
greater local autonomy, it would be important for a concordat to clarify those 
instances where councils can act freely and independently, making ‘decisions 
based on their own judgement’;126 and when they should prioritise 
implementation of centralised policies, acting on instruction from Whitehall. To 
this end, a new concordat should set out a distinction between central and local 
matters, thereby clarifying the allocation of power between the two levels. This 
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distinction would also give effect to subsidiarity, providing a foundation upon 
which the most effective level of authority could be specified in respect of certain 
areas of competence.  
There is obvious similarity between this proposal and the devolution 
settlements established with Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. These are 
underpinned by the 1998 Acts, amended by more recent legislation, and a similar 
statutory framework giving legal effect to this division of central and local 
authority is explored below. Unlike the delineation between reserved / excepted 
and devolved matters in Scotland, Wales127 and Northern Ireland, however, and 
in view of local government’s constitutional position, there would be no 
devolution of legislative competence recognised in the concordat, only 
administrative. Whilst institutions in Edinburgh, Belfast and Cardiff were 
created, and have been subsequently amended, ‘[o]n both administrative and 
legislative levels’,128 councils, beyond their limited secondary legislative 
capabilities, only have administrative powers under the authority of Parliament. 
Any distinction between central and local matters, therefore, would merely 
clarify the administrative responsibilities to be exercised at the respective levels, 
with legislative power remaining the exclusive competence of Parliament.  
In terms of identifying these central and local matters, powers remaining 
within the competence of central government would be those affecting the whole 
country, such as, for example, local governmental electoral boundaries, electoral 
processes, and councils’ institutional organisation. Leaving these matters within 
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Whitehall’s control would ensure uniformity across the country, consistency of 
democratic legitimacy and clarity of process (also potentially combating the 
aforementioned asymmetry of local government). In contrast, powers that might 
fall within the administrative competence of local authorities are potentially 
numerous. Council tax, housing, regeneration, and education are all matters that 
might be left for the sole attention of councils, thereby encouraging independent 
policy at the local level and making space for local decision-making and broad 
discretion, free from prescriptive, centralised supervision. It is unlikely, though, 
that all powers, relevant to local politics could be neatly divided into central and 
local matters. There are undoubtedly certain areas where both central and local 
government might need the authority to act, either jointly or concurrently, 
something that could be reflected by a third category, setting out shared 
matters.129 These might cover, for example, transport, agriculture or 
employment; that is, areas where a degree of uniformity across the country is 
desirable, but where it is also important that locally specific issues be addressed 
by local bodies with local resources. Due to the UK’s unitary constitution, 
however, and councils’ position as statutory corporations, local matters must be 
framed in such a way that ensures the superior power of the centre is not eroded. 
This could be achieved by setting out a broad framework of laws and policies at 
the centre, there stating the objective to be achieved, then leaving it – and being 
required to leave it – with councils to exercise their local powers freely and 
broadly, in their own specific ways, and without central interference. Taking 
housing as an example, central government could publish a policy stipulating the 
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need to provide more housing across the country and Parliament could pass a 
law, requiring councils to increase the number of available homes in their areas. 
As a potentially local matter, it should then be up to councils to decide how they 
might wish to fulfil this objective, relevant to unique challenges facing their 
locality; deciding, perhaps, to build new homes, or support the subsidisation of 
landlords – to give just two possible options. As this example shows, greater 
autonomy and discretion brings the need for greater control over local money. An 
approach consistent with this central-local distinction, and with discussions 
above, might be either to provide councils with more general grants, not specified 
for a particular purpose, or greater opportunity to raise their own revenue.  
A new central-local concordat, therefore, must be less about private 
agreement of the powers government is willing to relinquish, and more about 
wider consensus as to roles, responsibilities and powers, with a presumption in 
favour of subsidiarity. Real devolution rather than mere delegation. Though the 
2007 Concordat attempted to afford ‘[c]ouncils … the right to address the 
priorities of their communities … and to lead the delivery of public services in 
their area and shape its future without unnecessary direction or control’,130 the 
lack of any broad central commitment to councils’ need to fulfil this role freely 
and independently hindered its success, as did the lack of any specific 
acknowledgement of what substantive areas this might cover. A new concordat, 
therefore, must correct this. It should honour the roles that central and local 
government both play, recognising a distinction between central, local and shared 
matters, and demonstrating awareness of the importance of subsidiarity. In this 
                                                          
130 Department for Communities and Local Government and the Local Government Association 
Central-Local Concordat (London: DCLG, 2007) p 10. 
way, it can guarantee a bottom-up approach to localism, guarding councils from 
prescriptive centralised supervision. To correct one of the most prominent 
misgivings of the 2007 Concordat, however, a new agreement must be recognised 
and protected at law, as this next section discusses.   
(ii) Legislating for a bottom up approach 
Alongside a political agreement, legislation is needed both to give legal 
recognition to any consensus reached in a concordat and to spell out more clearly, 
within a legal framework, a bottom-up approach to localism. This section 
explains the form of such legislation before considering how legal mechanisms 
might protect this approach.  
An Act giving recognition to an agreement, and setting out a legal 
framework for its bottom-up approach, could take a similar form to legislation 
underpinning the devolution settlements. On this basis, it could protect the 
division of authority between central, local and shared matters, set out in the 
concordat, clarify ‘difficulties that might arise in the outworking of the 
relationships’,131 and ensure ‘that a rebalancing of the relationship [does] … not 
result in a gradual creep of power back to the centre’.132 Whilst, as has already 
been noted, there are important constitutional differences between the devolved 
institutions and local government, the combined effect of a political concordat, 
recognised and protected through a legislative framework,133 could go some way 
to ensuring a workable, central-local relationship founded on subsidiarity and a 
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bottom-up approach. Indeed, juxtaposition of a political agreement and legal 
framework also lies at the heart of the Northern Powerhouse agenda, 
devolutionary deals sitting within a framework established through the 2016 Act. 
Whilst concerns for that initiative have already been discussed, the basic 
premise, predicated on combining political agreement with a legal framework, is 
well established and could provide the foundation for broader devolution to local 
government. 
One of the most fundamental aspects of legislation giving effect to a 
bottom-up approach would be legal protection of the concordat’s distinction 
between central, local and shared matters. Continuing the parallel already 
drawn with the devolution settlements, to prevent central government from 
erring into local matters, legislation could include a provision mirroring Section 2 
of the Scotland Act 2016. This states: 
‘In section 28 of the Scotland Act 1998 (Acts of the Scottish Parliament) at 
the end add— 
“But it is recognised that the Parliament of the United Kingdom 
will not normally legislate with regard to devolved matters without 
the consent of the Scottish Parliament”’.134 
This section is carefully drafted so as to acknowledge, rather than enforce, the 
Sewel Convention, mindful that making it a legal requirement to recognise 
Scotland’s realm of devolved matters would limit the legislative competence of 
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Parliament.135 Nonetheless, a provision on similar lines could protect the 
distinction between central, local and shared matters, by providing that the 
Secretary of State will ‘not normally exercise functions with regard to local 
matters without the consent of concerned local authorities’.136 Where government 
acts within or affects the realm of local matters, without this consent, it could 
then fall to the Administrative Court to determine instances of ultra vires in a 
similar fashion to that seen in cases concerning the devolution settlements.137 
Ordinary legislation, however, susceptible to repeal or amendment 
through a simple majority process, would be insufficient to provide this legal 
framework and protect a bottom-up approach realised through any concordat. It 
has already been noted that one of the problems underpinning recent local 
government reform is the ease with which governments and Parliament are able 
to effect change on local government. The enactment and repeal of piecemeal 
reforms, often at the whim of prevailing political views, are frequently introduced 
with little input from councils, thus contributing to the aforementioned top-down 
approach. If legislation is to be introduced, therefore, recognising a concordat and 
providing a legal framework for a bottom-up approach, it needs to include 
measures that ensure governments cannot too easily enact politically motivated 
changes that unravel this new approach, re-establish a centralist culture and tilt 
‘the balance of power between central and local government’ back towards 
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Whitehall.138 To this end, legislation should do two things. First, it should set out 
the process through which a central-local concordat can be amended, and 
secondly, it must offer a degree of entrenchment to this legal framework to 
ensure it cannot be too easily altered or repealed. This section now goes on to 
consider how these objectives might be achieved.  
The discussion above explores the way in which a provision, similar to 
that reflecting the Sewel Convention in the devolution legislation, could restrict 
government from encroaching on matters intended for local use. It is important, 
however, that procedural restrictions also be put in place to prevent government 
from unilaterally amending the concordat without the agreement of local 
government. It would be contrary to any political agreement if the centre could 
impose alterations to arrangements without the consensus of the other parties. 
Legislation, therefore, in providing the legal framework for this bottom-up 
approach, could clarify the procedure through which a concordat should be 
amended. This could potentially take a number of forms. It might, for example, 
be set out in a Sewel Convention-type provision, similar to that already 
discussed, by requiring any changes to the concordat to have the consent of local 
authorities. Other possible options, though, might include the requirement that 
government be required to consult councils before introducing any changes to the 
agreement, or the need for any changes to be supported by two-thirds of the 
House of Commons. Whatever form such procedural restrictions might take, they 
should serve to protect the political agreement and the bottom-up approach that 
that is designed to ensure. 
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With regards to entrenchment of the legal framework itself, the notion of 
legislation protecting a more empowered local government from centralist 
tendencies has been considered before. In 2013, the Political and Constitutional 
Reform Select Committee discussed proposals for a code to clarify the 
relationship between central and local government and, to this end, it set out 
various principles.139 With particular relevance to this discussion, however, the 
report also proposed that the code be enforced by statute, with legislation 
enjoying a degree of entrenchment to protect local government from the ‘default 
position of [central] micromanagement’.140 To this end, the report set out possible 
models for entrenchment, which are drawn from, where relevant, as this section 
progresses. 
The question of entrenchment and the need to secure protection for 
valuable constitutional arrangements, in the face of parliamentary sovereignty, 
is a complex issue and its application in respect of bottom-up localism is just one 
strand. There are, in reality, other features of our constitution that might benefit 
from special protection, as discussions elsewhere reflect.141 The issue arises due 
to the lack of a codified constitution and the consequential status of Acts of the 
sovereign Parliament providing the highest source of domestic law. It is a central 
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facet of orthodox sovereignty that no Act is immune from repeal and that 
Parliament can pass any law whatsoever (political constraints notwithstanding). 
Consequently, legislation setting out features of the Constitution – human rights, 
devolution, local government, for example – is blessed with no special status and 
is susceptible to ordinary repeal or amendment. Constitutional protection for 
such features is a challenge not conducive to existing arrangements.  
Despite this, Smith observes that there are ‘certain Acts of Parliament 
whose repeal is virtually unthinkable. The Scotland Act is one … example’.142 
The Scotland Act enjoys this special status on the foundation of democratic 
support in favour of devolution and the institutions in Edinburgh;143 whether 
local government can be said to command the same degree of popular enthusiasm 
is an important question with a doubtful answer, as consideration of local 
turnouts, above, suggests. Of course, if a political agreement, set out in a 
concordat, were to be endorsed by popular consent, as discussed, then this might 
go some way to providing legislation recognising that concordat and setting out a 
framework for bottom-up localism the foundation necessary to achieve a ‘special 
status’ similar to the Scotland Act. More than democratic support, though, it is 
also a question of culture. In the aftermath of the 1998 devolution settlements, 
there was a culture shift in Westminster to ensure that respect for devolution, in 
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the ordinary law and policy-making processes, became conventional. Margaret 
Beckett, then Leader of the Commons, noted in 1998 that  
‘the Government would expect that a convention would be adopted that 
Westminster would not normally legislate with regard to devolved matters 
without the consent of the devolved body. The Government is likely to 
oppose any private Member’s bill which seeks to alter the law on devolved 
subjects in Scotland or Northern Ireland’.144  
This principle was endorsed by the Commons Procedure Committee and is 
reflected in the aforementioned Sewel Convention.145 Whilst there are ongoing 
issues with regards to the relationship between central and devolved 
institutions,146 if a bottom-up approach to localism is to be established, a similar 
culture needs to be observed in respect of the role that councils play in the 
Constitution, relative to central government. This has been recognised by the 
Communities and Local Government Committee, which notes that: ‘[w]e would 
like to see a culture of devolution embedded in all Government Departments’.147 
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This article has already explained the difficulties arising from central 
government’s top-down approach, and the extent to which any culture shift might 
be observed is dependent on the success of aforementioned political agreement 
and the legislation introduced to give it effect. Notwithstanding the democratic 
support and underlying culture shift that underpins the devolution settlements, 
however, there is clear scope for considering a form of legislation that would offer 
this bottom-up approach protection. 
Legislation, recognising the concordat and providing the legal framework 
for a bottom-up approach, must contain measures that prevent it from being too 
easily repealed, making it harder for a majority government to interfere in local 
matters and upset the bottom-up approach realised through that concordat. Such 
legislation, specifically affecting councils in England, would be subject to the 
‘English votes for English laws’ (EVEL) process, introduced in October 2015 as an 
amendment to House of Commons Standing Order 83.148 This provides that, 
where the Speaker of the House identifies a Bill (or part of a Bill) that relates 
only to England149 and concerns an area of policy equivalent to devolved matters 
in other parts of the UK, the MPs representing English constituencies discuss 
and vote on the Bill (or its relevant parts) in a Legislative Grand Committee. 
Their consent is required before the Bill, or English-specific provisions at least, 
can be enacted.150 This extra level of legislative scrutiny is not an insignificant 
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constitutional hurdle and would provide a further measure of constitutional 
protection for local government reform. 
The EVEL process notwithstanding, however, we now consider two 
possible ways in which an Act might be protected from easy repeal. The first 
involves measures offering, what Elliott terms, contingent entrenchment.151 This 
might require, for instance, a two-thirds majority in both Houses of Parliament 
before that Act be altered or repealed. A measure along these lines was proposed 
by the Political and Constitutional Reform Select Committee in its consultation 
for a written UK Constitution. The Committee proposed that ‘[t]he freedoms and 
duties of local government in England … be defined in an Independent Local 
Government Act. Such an Act may only be amended with the agreement of two-
thirds of the members of each House of Parliament, and of the majority of people 
voting in a referendum’.152 Requiring more than a simple majority in respect of 
such an Act would ensure the need for cross-party support to repeal or alter 
legislation providing a legal framework for a bottom-up approach, meaning a 
government would find it more difficult to impose centralist reforms on councils. 
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An alternative form of contingent entrenchment was also proposed in the 
Political and Constitutional Reform Select Committee’s 2013 report, which 
suggested amendment of  ‘section 2(1) of the Parliament Act 1911 to ensure that 
the consent of the Lords … [be] required for any Bills that … [alter] the “powers, 
functions or structure of local government”’.153 The rationale here would be to set 
in place a ‘lock’, making it harder for the House of Commons – and thus the 
Government – to influence local matters, without wider parliamentary consent. 
Himsworth rightly questions, though, whether it is ‘constitutionally intelligent … 
to place the duty of securing local autonomy and local democracy on a legislative 
chamber which is itself unelected’.154 Moreover, and in respect of both these 
proposed examples, neither requiring a two-third majority in both House or the 
express consent of the House of Lords takes the focus away from the centre, 
especially when we consider questions of a politicised House of Lords and the 
potential for future reform. 
A second way in which an Act might protect this legal framework for a 
bottom-up approach could be through exclusion of implied repeal. Whilst this 
would not completely prevent revocation of such legislation, it would at least 
require explicit acknowledgement of the Act’s repeal or alteration and, as a 
result, a degree of political entrenchment. The oft cited words of Laws LJ in 
Thoburn v Sunderland City Council155 show that certain constitutional statutes 
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155 [2003] QB 151. Laws LJ stated: ‘We should recognise a hierarchy of Acts … ‘ordinary’ statutes and 
‘constitutional’ statutes. …[A] constitutional statute is one which (a) conditions the legal relationship 
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are immune from implied repeal and to the European Communities Act 1972, 
Human Rights Act 1998 and Devolution Acts one could add any future legislation 
protecting a bottom-up approach to local government. Indeed, even outside Laws 
LJ’s category, the Localism Act 2011 provides an example of a provision protected 
from implied repeal. As Varney explains, section 2 of the Act states that should 
Parliament ‘choose to restrict the powers of local authorities after the coming into 
force of the [Localism] Act … s. 2(4) requires that … it do so expressly’.156 This 
‘appears to … exclude the operation of … implied repeal from the realm of local 
authority powers … [offering] a degree of what might be termed constitutional 
protection to the new power of general competence’.157 Protection from implied 
repeal, therefore, whilst not necessarily placing legislation beyond the ordinary 
processes of Parliament, would at least ensure a need for express intention to 
change an Act setting out the legal framework for a bottom-up approach, thus 
offering a degree of protection to the central-local relationship. Though the UK’s 
constitutional arrangements mean that opportunities for contingent 
entrenchment are limited, therefore, this section has explored how political and 
legal measures might combine to recognise and set out a bottom-up approach to 
localism, rebalancing the central-local relationship and offering councils greater 
protection from the centralist tendencies of Whitehall.  
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4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Localism in England is in need of fundamental change. Whilst recent 
governments have made attempts to decentralise, numerous factors have 
conspired to prevent their full realisation. Chief amongst these is the persistence 
of a top-down approach, evidenced by provisions and policies that ensure 
Whitehall retains an overriding say in the way councils fulfil their functions and 
exercise local powers. Critical of this centralist culture, this article has explored 
the case for a bottom-up approach to localism. It has outlined the way in which 
political and legal mechanisms might combine to rebalance the central-local 
relationship, protecting potentially more empowered councils from Whitehall’s 
centralist tendencies. Whilst this article has explained how existing 
constitutional arrangements might establish and accommodate a bottom-up 
approach to localism, however, it is equally mindful of factors beyond the 
readjustment of the political and constitutional landscape within which councils 
operate. It was noted, above, that the success of the 1998 devolution settlements 
has, in no small part, been due to a culture shift in Westminster. The extent to 
which any such shift might be observed with regards to local government is a 
matter for the politicians themselves. Only if those working within government 
respect the role that councils play in the constitutional framework can local 
government really begin to exercise the powers and responsibilities that have 
long been intended for local use and innovation. 
